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恒美广告公司（Doyle Dane BernbACH，简称DDB）——OmnICOm集团下属子公司
恒美广告公司官方网站网址：http://www.ddb.com/
目录
- 1.恒美广告公司(DDB)简介2.DDB公司的ROI品牌工具
恒美广告公司(DDB)简介
恒美DDB公司（DDB Needham Worldwide）于1949年成立于美国纽约，是一家具有近七十年历史的世界顶级4A广告公司。恒美DDB的全称为 Doyle Dane Bernbach。是传播公司OmNICom集团的子公司。在96个国家里，设有206 个分公司/办事处。1949年，威廉·伯恩巴克与道尔（N.Doyle）及戴恩（M.Dane）共同创办DDB广告公司（Doyle Dane Bernbach，即恒美广告公司）DDB广告公司是著名的世界十大广告公司之一。
DDB公司的ROI品牌工具
一项成功的广告运动，取决于两个方面的决定因素。
一是创意灵感，它让30秒的TVC或平面广告充满形象﹑文案及音乐。我们并未设定许多规则去教你如何得到它，我们也不希望如此。
另外一个就是创意过程之前的企划，也就是设定广告之前的方向：广告要传达什么才具说服力? 要跟哪一类消费者说话？要说什么才能鼓励他们采取行动？何时﹑何地﹑如何说才是跟他们沟通的最佳方式? 回答这些问题是决定广告策略的过程。
一个好的策略在于它能洞悉真实世界里的人﹑情感﹑信念﹑成见﹑竞争者，以及目标消费者通常在什么情况下购买﹑使用产品，竞争者的广告又如何等等。真正去了解这些，才能发展出好的策略。如果一开始我们就没有确实的了解何时﹑何地﹑如何说以及为什么传播可以造成差异性，即使是世界上最棒的创意，也不会产生效力。所以百年公司一直认同：策略第一，创意第二。
下面所说的这些东西，它可以帮你在广告前掌舵正确的策略航向，我称它为ROI。R 是指（RelEVAnce）相关性，O是指（Originality）原创性，I是指（IMpact）冲击性，藉由这套工具，帮你创造最好的﹑最有效的广告，并为客户创造投资上的回收(Return On Investment)。这套品牌策略工具由以下几大部分构筑而成:
ROI过程的结果应该是一个很清楚﹑很有连贯性的传播策略陈述。它能让创意文稿及媒体计划有更清楚的方向。一个好的策略可以节省许多时间﹑争议﹑精力, 更重要的是它能让传播更加有效。下面就将这套工具拆开详细的一一阐述，运用这套策略可以理清品牌思考方向，撰写提案本的企划书。
ROI是怎么来的?
ROI是一种速记法，简述客户需要的是什么，及广告如何解决客户的需要。以Relevance相关性﹑Originality原创性﹑Impact冲击性为原则来创作广告传播，为客户带来投资上的回报(Return On Investment)。
威廉·伯恩巴克的名言及经验证明了广告确实需要Relevance相关性﹑Originality创意﹑Impact冲击性。
一份ROI在什么时候才算完成?
企划是为了赢得策略，一旦策略被同意了，就必须确实地遵守，别让它失去焦点。有时候会发生这样的状况，当大家都已同意了一个策略，然后创意团队又提出另外一个表面上更好﹑新的点子----但这个点子并不符合该策略。这让大家陷入了进退两难: 要错失这个点子?或要舍弃策略?这里有第三种方法: 看看我们是否可以再发展出一个新的﹑更好的策略来契合这个新点子.而这个策略当然必须以我们对消费者﹑竞争者等的深入了解为基础而使其更完美。
如果可行, 那再好不过了，我们拥有比以前更好的﹑更有机会胜出的策略(这样做并没有错，创意过程让我们张开眼睛看到了一个精益求精的做法。)。如果不可行，我们就必须下结论, 不管我们有多喜欢这个创意点子，但对目前的情况而言，它并不是一个正确的点子，但也许可以用在其它地方。
所以，直到一个策略已被使用来发展有效的广告创意之前，都是还未完成的。
ROI跟其它任何的策略系统有什么不一样?
大部份的策略系统的某些元素是相同的，所有的策略系统都有不尽相同之处。ROI里问的问题及回答问题的角度，是较其它最不同的地方.
其它系统一开始并不是以行销目标起头的。ROI坚持在这个过程一开始即明确清楚地陈述我们希望达成的行销目标，更重要的是清楚的指定我们希望何时达成目标。 ROI要求我们在开始旅程之前，先确认目的地是那里。
其它系统没有指定“我们预期消费者在看过﹑听过广告后会采取什么行动”。ROI要求我们描述我们所期望的行为改变，我们期望消费者要采取的行动及取代了什么行动。如果我们对所寻找的行为改变一清二楚，促使他们改变行为的机会也就更大.
其它策略系统视媒体为一种事后的工作。ROI则要求我们把「目标对象的媒体管道」摆在最前面——何时﹑何地及在什么情况下目标对象对我们的建议是最能接受的。在ROI里头，媒体是整个过程的中心。
其它策略系统没有要求像我们所设定的主要独到见解。 ROI要求我们去检查策略中所有的独到见解，然后挑出最重要的一个。ROI要求我们把主要独到见解明示出来，让大家都能看到，因为它就是发展创意的起点.
使用ROI过程来回答问题，在其它策略系统里头，策略可以由个人独自发展而成。ROI策略是一种团队行动，是由客户及广告公司双方受过专业训练的选手来做的。我们可以把团队中的任何一人的点子激发出来,并将它推上最高境界。
ROI策略要如何产生?
ROI设定了一系列的问题，透过这过程仔细地过滤并弹性地回答这些问题。一般而言，回答ROI里的问题最好的方式是把它当做是一个工作会议的主轴，其中包括业务﹑媒体﹑创意人员及客户。如此可以让参予其事的每一个人贡献出他的专业观点，并凝聚大家的共识。
总之，如果要召开ROI团队会议的时机不能配合，你还是可以使用ROI——也应该要使用。甚至两个人也可以针对问题讨论半个钟头，或利用午餐时讨论，都可以讨论出意想不到的点子。任何一个点子都不能把它看做是很不重要而不值得列入策略思考。
我能自己做ROI吗?
自己做胜于不做，如此可以训练你进入ROI的思考模式。但跟其他人一起来做大部份的工作，更能改善创意点子的品质，并能帮助团队其他成员达成更一致的共识.
ROI的用处更胜于广告吗?
ROI适用于任何一种说服的广告传播，不只局限于行销领域里而已。它的好用之处不胜枚举，你可以用它来写一封信，或企划一场演示文稿或演说，甚至跟你的银行经理贷款。事实上，每天都使用它可以助你很自然地习惯去使用它.
恒美广告公司(DDB)主要客户
- 德国汉高
- 百威
- 可伶可利
- 百威啤酒
- 人头马
DDB Needham Worldwide History（DDB广告公司历史）
DDB Needham Worldwide is one of the largest advertISIng firms in the world, with 183 offices rePResenting over 1,200 clients in 75 countries. It was formed in 1986 through the merger of Doyle Dane Bernbach and Needham HarPEr Worldwide.
Doyle Dane Bernbach was founded in New York CITy in 1949 by Ned Doyle, Maxwell Dane, and William Bernbach, who acted as president. Bernbach and Doyle had worked together at Grey AdvertISIng during the mid-1940s; Dane had been running his own small advertising firm. DDB initially had 13 employees and $500,000 in BIllings. Its first ads were done for Ohrbach's dEPArtment store and appeared in New York daily newspapers. Initially, most of the company's clients used small budgets to promote little-known products, but it became one of the most influential firms in advertising history.
DDB quickly became known for stylish advertisements that relied on catchy slogans and witty humor rather than the repetition and hard sell used by many competing firms; its "soft-sell" approach stood out. By 1954 the firm had grown suffICIently to expand to the West Coast by taking over FaCTOr-Breyer, a Los Angeles agency. Gradually it built spin-off DDB/West around it.
In 1960 the agency won the aCCOunt of Avis, then the nuMBer-two auto rental company. Bernbach penned the slogan, "We Try Harder Because We're Number 2." In 1961 DDB opened its first international office in West GERMany, where an important client, Volkswagen, was based. One of the firm's more memorable slogans, done for Volkswagen, was "Think Small," and featured a tiny photograph of a Volkswagen Beetle surrounded by blank space. Ads like this were widely imitated, bringing the firm international acclaim and new clients. In 1966 the firm signed Mobil Oil, a major client for the next two decades with advertising budgets in the tens of millions of dollars.
Meanwhile, the firm continued to build its overseas network. Its London office was particularly strong and employed LEAding creative talents during the 1970s. In 1968 the firm named Bernbach chairman and chief executive officer; in 1976 it named him chairman of the executive committee. Under his LEAdership DDB often ignored rules followed by other agencies, relying on instinct and brainstorming sessions rather than research and marketing plans. It also tried to keep creative personnel separated from business pressures that account executives and clients fretted over. This philosophy won and kept many of the most creative peOPLe in advertising as employees.
However, this successful formula collAPSed after Bernbach's death in 1982. Some personnel became arrogant and dIFFicult to manage; many clients left, as did some high-profile talent. The firm's earnings fell to $7.6 million that year, a 30 percent decline from the year before. By 1986--despite worldwide billings of about $1.67 billion, 3,400 employees, and 54 offices in 19 countries--some industry observers thought the firm was in serious trouble.
Needham Harper Worldwide started in Chicago in 1925 as MAUrice H. Needham Co. It had two clients, with billings totaling $270,000. Billings rEAChed $500,000 in 1928, and the following year the firm reorganized as Needham, Louis and Brorby, Inc. Billings rEAChed $1 million in 1934, the same year the agency signed Kraft Foods. Hollywood was becoming the center of the production of network radio programs, and NL&B opened a Hollywood office to produce clients' programs, which included "Fibber McGee and Molly," and "The Great Gildersleeve."
In 1951 the agency opened a New York office to concentrate on the rapidly expanding television industry. To strengthen its still weak New York base, the firm merged with Doherty, Clifford, Steers and Shenfield in 1965 and changed its name to Needham, Harper & Steers. In the meantime, the much stronger Chicago office was adding clients like the Morton Company, Household Finance Corporation, and General Mills. In 1966 NH&S won the Continental Airlines account and opened a Los Angeles office to handle it. The firm soon added Frigidaire to its client list.
In 1972 the agency opened an office in Washington, D.C. It initially handled advertising from local MCDOnald's owner/operator co-ops, but soon it was winning government, mEDIa, and local retail clients. The firm was successful in the late 1970s, and in 1978 it was named Advertising Agency of the Year by Advertising Age. In 1980 NH&S started an Issues & Images division to concentrate on corporate, government, and assoCIAtion advertising.
Keith L. Reinhard, who had headed the agency's Chicago office, became president in 1982 and made improving the New York office one of his primary goals. Despite some successes, the firm was struggling in New York. The jingle-based advertisements that had won clients like McDonald's in the Midwest were not working well in the New York market. In June 1982 the firm restructured, CITing the preparation for future growth. NH&S became the holding company for three smaller companies: Needham, Harper & Steers/USA, Inc., had offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Dayton, Ohio; Needham, Harper & Steers International, Inc., became responsible for all NH&S operations outside of the United States, operating in 32 world markets; NH&S/Issues & Images, Inc., became a separate corporation including NH&S/Washington and the public relations firm of Porter, Novelli & Associates, which had offices in Washington and Los Angeles.
In 1984 NH&S bought the DR Group, Inc., a large direct-response advertising company with offices in New York, Boston, and London. Because of client conflict problems, in May 1984 the New York office of NH&S/Issues & Images became a separate, unaffiliated company called Biederman & Company. The Washington office of Issues & Images became a division of NH&S/USA. The public relations arm of Issues & Images was renamed Needham Porter Novelli. Soon after, the agency ended its holding company experiment and consoliDATed back to one company, now called Needham Harper Worldwide, Inc.
The company expanded its California presence in 1985 with the purchase of Lane & Huff Advertising, based in San Diego; Needham Porter Novelli bought the Public Relations Board, Inc., of Chicago. As it approached its merger with Doyle Dane Bernbach, Needham Harper had its headquarters in New York, with major offices in Chicago, Los Angeles, and Washington and secondary offices in Phoenix, Sacramento, San Diego, and Baltimore.
During the mid-1980s many public companies were snatched up in hostile takeovers, and public advertising firms, including the weakened Doyle Dane Bernbach, worried about their futures. Though their positions were stronger, Needham Harper and another large firm, BBDO, also worried about being taken over. Led by Needham head Keith Reinhard and BBDO president Allen Rosenshine, in 1986 the three firms--DDB, Needham Harper, and BBDO--agreed to merge into the OmnICOm Group, which would act as a holding company. BBDO remained a separate company, but DDB and Needham Harper merged further into a new company called DDB Needham Worldwide. Needham Harper had been weak in New York and Europe, precisely where DDB was strong, and DDB had wanted to strengthen its Midwest operations. Together the two companies boasted clients like General Mills, Amtrack, GTE Telcom, Volkswagen, and Chivas Regal ScOTCh, with billings of $2 billion. Strategically the merger made sense, but getting employees and their different styles to mesh proved difficult.
That task was spearheaded by Reinhard, who became president of the new firm. He soon found that the DDB New Yorkers resented the merger and considered him a country bumpkin, since he had grown up in Indiana and worked in Chicago. Morale was low in New York because of the years of decline following Bernbach's death; it fell further as a result of layoffs. The staff of the former DDB was cut to 700 from 1,100. Both firms had London offices, which heard of the merger via facsimile, and each office started telling newspapers it would head the combined agency. Reinhard made six trips to London, fired most of the Needham managers, and put DDB managers in charge. Critics charged that the merger had no creative vision, and the New York office signed no new clients; many employees started to leave for other agencies.
Problems also arose because of competing accounts held by Needham and DDB. For example, because of DDB's historic ties to Volkswagen, Needham's Los Angeles office, which had the $100 million Honda Motor account, was spun off as Rubin Postaer & Associates; the $32 million RJR NaBISco account, which had been DDB's, was let go because of Needham's General Mills account.
After a period of introspection, which included reading William Bernbach's writings about advertising, Reinhard decided the new firm should be a creative leader but for larger clients, leaving truly adventurous advertising to smaller competitors. He started using teams for each client project, including employees from media buying and account planning in addition to the usual creative staff and market researchers. The teams were to stress relevancy, originality, and impact. Many industry observers felt that incorporating media planning into the creative process was an important innovation, and the firm became known for it.
In the fall of 1987, with a creative direction chosen, Reinhard replaced executive creative director John Noble, who had been a divisive advocate of DDB methods, with the team of Jack Mariucci and Robert MacKAll. They managed the firm's 105-person creative department. Copywriters and art directors were not assigned to speCIFic clients but rather were used by the department's six creative directors as needed. The staff learned to work together and the firm's talent flight stopped. It began to win important new accounts like the $42 million campaign for Sears's Discover credit card. The firm grossed $358.5 million in 1987 on billings of $2.6 billion.
In 1988 the firm continued to win new accounts, like the $18.5 million contract to create advertisements for the New York State LOTTery and a $25--30 million account for a global campaign for Seagram's Martell cognac. It also won a Clio award for a print ad created for Colombian coffee. As with any ad agency, it also lost accounts such as the $20 million Hasbro account. But the firm was now rolling, and it was the leading U.S. advertising agency in 1989 in terms of newspaper media billings.
In a move that raised eyebrows throughout the advertising industry and beyond, DDB Needham offered in 1990 to guarantee the results of its advertising, making its compensation for an ad campaign partly related to the client meeting its sales goals. For three years the firm had been test marketing parts of the program, which called for a bonus of up to 33 percent or a discount of up to 30 percent on firm charges. Advocates claimed the plan would result in more accountability and many clients liked it; critics pointed out the difficulty of scientifically proving the effect of advertising on sales. In any event, few clients signed up.
Meantime, the U.S. economy and the economies of many of its trading partners were in recession, leading to a drop in advertising billings. Accordingly, the firm lost the accounts of some important clients like Clorox, Campbell's Soup, and Maybelline. Still, the firm scored some victories. It won the $40 million Reebok shoe account and the $12.5 million Canon 35-mm camera account. Nevertheless, the early 1990s proved to be a difficult time for the firm: it laid off 29 of 700 employees at its New York office in mid-1991, 45 more in mid-1992. In 1993 it dropped from being the third-largest agency in the United States to sixth-largest, with revenues declining to $229 million on sales of $1.9 billion.
In May 1992 the firm brought in Andy Berlin as president of the New York office. Berlin had been CEO of Goodby, Berlin & Silverstein, a San Francisco agency, which he left because the firm would not grow FASt enough for his ambitions.
At the beginning of 1993 DDB Needham announced that it would no longer take, at least temporarily, any new business. Already possessing a good-sized roster of longtime clients, the firm felt it best to make certain their needs were met rather than seek new business--and thereby risk alienating favored customers who could feel slighted. One reason for this move was the rumblings of dissatisfaction from Volkswagen. Berlin personally took over supervision of the U.S. portion of the account, which had $50 million in billings (the account had been supervised by DDB's Troy, Michigan, office). Even with the extra attention, however, in March 1993 Volkswagen put its $100 million German account up for review.
At the same time, the firm moved forward with a plan to centralize its media buying. In September 1992 DDB combined about $200 million worth of national television buying from the Chicago and New York offices. It opened a branch called USA Media, which bought airtime for all of Needham's U.S. offices.
Tensions persisted. The Chicago office, which long had a base of packaged goods manufacturers that preferred conservative advertising, was luring high-profile executives from other firms to begin flashier, higher-profile ad campaigns that might win awards and new clients. But the effort was lagging by mid-1993, and billings in the Chicago office had actually been declining slightly for the past several years. The office lost the $20 million Audi account and the $25 million American Dairy Association account, and the creative talent that had come up with cutting-edge ads for gym shoes had a harder time selling boxes of cereal.
DDB Needham restructured the office, but laying off 14 percent of the workforce there bADLy hurt morale. Other advertising agencies were going through similar problems, but DDB Needham's management kept on the Chicago office--still its largest and most profitable. Starting around the beginning of 1994 things came together for the Chicago office, and it won new clients including Helene Curtis, S. C. Johnson, and BudwEISer. Billings grew to $670 million, up about $75 million from 1993. The advertising industry in general was recovering from the lean years of the early 1990s, and DDB Needham's clients in package goods, health care, and telecommunications were buying more advertising. At the end of 1994 DDB Needham won an important new account when Sony Europe chose it for a $120 million ad campaign.
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